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Abstract
This contribution considers how the values of transparency and efficiency are realised in the context of “EU negotiations”
both in the internal and the external sphere. Legislating comes with a presumption of openness in the EU, while inter-
national negotiations have traditionally been assumed to require secrecy. However, irrespective of the basic paradigms,
the institutions often appear to follow a rather simple rationale that secrecy makes better decisions, both in internal and
external affairs. Similar efficiency concerns seem to relate to protecting the procedure of decision-making from external
influence. Therefore, the fundamental trade-off between democratic accountability and efficiency in the external and in-
ternal fields might not be all that different: efficiency is linked with secrecy, and comes at a cost for participation and
openness. I explain how the two paradigms—openness and transparency in legislative work and secrecy in international
negotiations have recently developed, and how the values of openness and efficiency have been addressed by the Court
of Justice of the European Union in its recent jurisprudence. This discussion witnesses to a possibility that the old secrecy
paradigm might be about to break in international relations while a new transparency paradigm in EU legislative work is
struggling to emerge.
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1. Introduction
The 2001 Laeken Declaration, adopted by the European
Council to guide the reform of the EU Treaties, illustrates
a vision for Europe. It stresses how the EU institutions
must be brought closer to citizens, and become more ef-
ficient andmore open. According to the Declaration, citi-
zens feel that “deals are all too often cut out of their sight
and they want better democratic scrutiny” and wish to
see a Europe that is “democratic and globally engaged”
(European Council, 2001). The Lisbon Treaty, which en-
tered into force in 2009, attempts to meet these expec-
tations but leaves much institutional discretion in the ap-
plication of these objectives. The question is not somuch
about whether the EU should be “open”, “efficient” or
“democratically and globally engaged”—of course the EU
should be all of these things. But when legislative guid-
ance is limited or outdated, the balance between these
objectives is in practice drawn by the institutions when
they are addressing appeals by individuals seeking access
to individual documents. This paper questions whether
this balance is currently the right one.
In institutional attitudes, efficiency often takes pri-
ority over other values such as openness or participa-
tion and results in secrecy rather than transparency
(see Leino, 2014). As the European Ombudsman has
noted, “there is an inevitable tension between the very
laudable principles of public consultation and partici-
pation, and the requirements of efficient law making”
(European Ombudsman, 2015, para. 44). The general
function of transparency and openness in EU decision-
making is defined in the preamble of Regulation No
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1049/2001 on public access to documents with refer-
ence to how it:
enables citizens to participate more closely in the
decision-making process and guarantees that the ad-
ministration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more ef-
fective andmore accountable to the citizen in a demo-
cratic system. Openness contributes to strengthening
the principles of democracy and respect for funda-
mental rights….
According to this quote, transparency’s function is seen
to apply to all kinds of decision-making, both legislative
and executive in nature. Efficiency is usually understood
in terms of the ability tomake compromises, the number
of decisions adopted and the ability to implement the
measures that have been adopted (see Novak, 2011). As
Advocate General Cruz Villalón recently put it:
Inconvenient though transparency may be…it has
never been claimed that democracy made legislation
“easier”, if easy is taken to mean “hidden from public
scrutiny”, as public scrutiny places serious constraints
on those involved in legislating. (Council v. Access Info
Europe, 2013, para. 67)
In this contribution, I will look at how the values of
transparency and efficiency are realised in the context
of “EU negotiations”, both in the internal sphere (legislat-
ing) and the external sphere (international negotiations,
largely an executive function).1 Legislating comes with a
presumption of openness in the EU, while international
negotiations have traditionally been assumed to require
secrecy. However, irrespective of the field of action and
the basic paradigms applicable to them, the institutions
often appear to follow a rather simple rationale that
secrecy leads to better decisions, both in internal and
external affairs (Curtin, 2012, p. 471). Similar efficiency
concerns seem to relate to protecting the procedure of
decision-making from external influence. Therefore, the
fundamental trade-off between democratic accountabil-
ity and efficiency in the external and internal fields might
not be all that different: efficiency is linked with secrecy,
and comes at a cost for participation and openness.
In the following, I will explain how the two
paradigms—openness and transparency in legislative
work and secrecy in international negotiations—have
recently developed, and how the values of openness
and efficiency have been addressed by the CJEU in its
recent jurisprudence, which can be seen as a sort of
“game changer” (see Abazi & Hillebrandt, 2015, p. 825).
This discussion reveals a possibility that the old secrecy
paradigm might be about to break in international rela-
tionswhile a new transparency paradigm in EU legislative
work is struggling to emerge.
2. Two Opposite Paradigms: Secrecy and Transparency
Secrecy in the area of international relations has been an
exceptionally strong paradigm (see Leino, in press). For-
eign affairs have been traditionally characterised by se-
cret deals and treaties (Macmillan, 2011). The security
paradigm in international relations dates back to a time
when it was a much more exotic business than it is to-
day. Secrets were primarily stolen for tactical reasons, in
order to buttress national secrecy or political advantage,
and not only for the interest of a general “right to know”.
A strong secrecy paradigm is also built into the EU
public access regime. The most relevant exception for in-
ternational relations is included in Article 4(1)(a) of Reg-
ulation 1049/2001, which establishes that:
The institutions shall refuse access to a docu-
ment where disclosure would undermine the protec-
tion of…the public interest as regards…international
relations.
It is a broadly defined exception, which not only in-
creases discretion at the stage of deciding on public ac-
cess but also the role of Courts in settling how the excep-
tion is to be interpreted.
Unlike the exceptions under Article 4(2) of the Regu-
lation, the exceptions under Article 4(1) include no “pub-
lic interest” test, which requires the institution to con-
sider whether access should be granted despite the fact
that its disclosure would be likely to cause harm. The
Court has stressed that the “particularly sensitive and es-
sential nature of the interests protected” under this ex-
ception and its mandatory nature confers on decisions
on public access “a complex and delicate nature which
calls for the exercise of particular care. Such a decision
requires, therefore, a ‘margin of appreciation’” (Sison v.
Council, 2007, para. 35). Even a nominal reasoning can
be adequate if otherwise sensitive interests would be
harmed through disclosure of the very information that
the exception is designed to protect (Sison v. Council,
2007, paras. 81–83). The way the CJEU has interpreted
the exception has strengthened the understanding that
international relations are hard to conduct in public, and
that they should, as the main rule, remain confidential.
A similar paradigm also exists in most national Freedom
of Information (public access) systems.2
As far as legislative negotiations among EU states
are concerned, the paradigm is the opposite. Since the
1 Defining what exactly counts as “executive power” in the EU has often relied on a “residual” approach, treating executive power as the power that is
not judicial or legislative in nature, i.e. as the power that is not exercised by anyone else (see Curtin, 2009, p. 53). The negotiation and conclusion of
international agreements is an executive function that is neither legislative nor judicial in nature.
2 For example, in the rather liberal Finnish system, documents relating to the conduct of foreign relations are secret, unless otherwise decided, see Act
on the Openness of Government Activities, 1999, section 24. In the relevant government proposal, this secrecy regime is justified with reference to
how only very few countries follow the principle of openness and, in addition, the international practice is that negotiating parties’ statements and
positions are not released without their consent, and that states follow each other’s’ confidentiality rules.
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Treaty of Lisbon, EU legislative work should take place
in the open (Article 15 TFEU). Regulation No 1049/2001
acknowledges the need to grant even “wider access”
to “documents in cases where the institutions are act-
ing in their legislative capacity…while at the same time
preserving the effectiveness of the institutions’ decision-
making process”. Legislative documents are defined as
those that relate to procedures resulting in legally bind-
ing acts in or for the Member States. This condition cer-
tainly applies to many international agreements as well,
but has so far received no attention by the Court. The pro-
visions relating to legislative matters have been subject
to the Court’s landmark ruling in Turco, which stresses
how increased openness
enables citizens to participate more closely in the
decision-making process and guarantees that the ad-
ministration enjoys greater legitimacy and is more
effective and more accountable to the citizen in a
democratic system. Those considerations are clearly
of particular relevance where the Council is acting
in its legislative capacity…. Openness in that respect
contributes to strengthening democracy by allowing
citizens to scrutinize all the information which has
formed the basis of a legislative act. The possibility for
citizens to find out the considerations underpinning
legislative action is a precondition for the effective ex-
ercise of their democratic rights. (Kingdom of Sweden
and Maurizio Turco v. Council, 2008, paras. 45–46)
The Lisbon principles relating to transparency specifically
aim at creating a paradigm shift through an explicit ac-
knowledgement that EU legislativework should no longer
to be understood as a traditional, secretive diplomatic
process (e.g. Westlake & Galloway, 2004, pp. 372–373).
The application of two different paradigms presumes
that a distinction could be usefully made between what
is “internal” and what is “external”. This is hardly the
case today. Internal logics of legislation seep into exter-
nal negotiations and vice versa. Internal legislative activ-
ity has a strong international dimension. Not only are
many important external measures based on “internal”
policy competences (e.g. environmental policy) via the
doctrine of implied external powers; today, internal leg-
islative activity has a strong international dimension (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2015b). The EU frequently uses leg-
islative techniques with territorial extension and exer-
cises global regulatory power through EU legislation (the
“Brussels Effect”) (see Bradford, 2012; Scott, 2014, p. 87
et seq;). The Commission has recently made a point of
how “virtually all Internal Market policies carry to some
degree an ‘international dimension’” and require “ade-
quate and consistent consideration” and in all other in-
ternational fora “to adequately represent and promote
the principles of the European Internal Market in the
world” (European Commission, 2015b). In fact, many sit-
uations that in the classic internal–external dichotomy
fall under “internal” activities, because they are largely
based on EU legislation, deal with third states, interna-
tional organisations, or citizens or companies of third
states (see e.g. Scott, 2014). The interest of foreign diplo-
mats stationed in the EU is focused more on influenc-
ing the EU legislative procedure than on secret interna-
tional treaty negotiations in the classic sense. For exam-
ple, a report relating to US influence in the adoption of
the REACH legislation demonstrates how US diplomatic
posts were directed to influencing future EU chemicals
policy, and concludes with a finding that the US efforts
brought about significant concessions in the draft (Wax-
man, 2004). This illustrates how post-Lisbon, as far as leg-
islativematters are concerned, life should be easy for the
simple spy: most stages of the process should take place
in the open.
The exception that is of greatest relevance for effi-
ciency concerns is Article 4(3) of Regulation 1049/2001,
the “space to think” exception:
Access to a document, drawn up by an institution for
internal use or received by an institution, which re-
lates to a matter where the decision has not been
taken by the institution, shall be refused if disclosure
of the document would seriously undermine the in-
stitution’s decision-making process, unless there is an
overriding public interest in disclosure.
Article 4(3) is the exception primarily invoked by the insti-
tutions when they wish to protect the efficiency of their
functioning (the lead case in this regard is Verein für Kon-
sumenteninformation v. Commission, 2005, para. 112).3
It is often relied on in addition to a substantive one in
Article 4(1) and (2). Denials of access are thus based
both on the substance of the document and the stage of
decision-making, if no final decision has yet been taken
on the matter. However, there would seem to be at least
two exceptions to this practice. First, in legislative mat-
ters Article 4(3) has also been invoked alone (see most
notably Council v. Access Info Europe, 2013, where the
Council relied on one exception ground only, that being
the first paragraph of Article 4(3)). Second, when a mat-
ter falls substantively under the international relations
exception, the institutions would seem to refrain from in-
voking Article 4(3) irrespective of whether they are pro-
tecting their own internal decision-making stage or the
actual negotiating procedure with third states (see be-
low). The explanation for this institutional practice is sim-
ple: the public interest test that would then become ap-
plicable in matters falling under international relations,
where potential public interest in gaining access can oth-
erwise be ignored.
3. Internal Logics in External Negotiations
The internal–external dichotomy described above is par-
ticularly questionable in the context of international reg-
3 I have discussed this case law in Leino (2011).
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ulatory agreements that have a direct impact on indi-
viduals and their rights. Many key aspects of our daily
life depend on rules and decisions adopted at interna-
tional level, later to be adopted into EU law (on this,
see Mendes, 2015). Despite these developments, post-
Lisbon case law has emphasised the formal division be-
tween legislative and non-legislative documents (Curtin
& Leino, 2016). The most crucial question in determin-
ing the scope of public access has therefore become
whether the documents relate to a legislative procedure.
In this case, the openness paradigm should in principle
apply, even though this is something with which the in-
stitutions are struggling (Leino, 2014). In practice, the dis-
tinction between legislative and non-legislative is rather
artificial and does not reflect the realities of EU decision-
making, where many procedures do not fall clearly un-
der either of these two categories (see Curtin & Leino,
2016; see also ClientEarth v. Commission, 2015; Schlyter
v. Commission, 2015). The openness paradigm has also
offered the institutions an excuse to argue that if a docu-
ment does not relate to a legislative procedure—which is
the case with many documents relating to international
relations—then the principle of openness has less rele-
vance. It is the recent jurisprudence and other events re-
lating to topical international negotiations that we turn
to next.
3.1. Case Law
There are currently three lead cases from the European
Courts that discuss transparency in the context of “new”
types of international agreements. The first case, which
was brought by Sophie in ’t Veld MEP under the public
access rules, concerned a Council Legal Service opinion
on the proposed legal basis of the draft Council decision
to authorise the Commission to launch negotiations for
the so-called SWIFT Agreement (Sophie in ‘t Veld v. Coun-
cil, 2012). In ’t Veld had received partial access, with the
Council invoking the exceptions relating to the protec-
tion of international relations and legal advice.While the
latter exception brought in the “public interest” test, its
application was difficult to avoid when the matter con-
cerned a legal service opinion, which the Council was re-
luctant to disclose. It argued that disclosure would not
only reveal information on certain provisions in the envis-
aged Agreement but also have a negative impact on the
EU negotiating position and damage the climate of con-
fidence. The legal basis issue was sensitive, since it had
an impact on the Parliament’s prerogatives, and was sub-
ject to disagreement between the institutions. In those
circumstances, the Council felt that disclosure of an inter-
nal opinion of the Legal Service, intended only for prelim-
inary discussions among the delegations, would be detri-
mental, and something that outweighed the public inter-
est in disclosure (paras. 10 and 15 of the contested Coun-
cil decision; see Sophie in ‘t Veld v. Council, 2012, para. 7).
The matter was first dealt with by the General Court and
then, following Council appeal, by the CJEU.
A key issue in these rulings concerned the substance
of the envisaged agreement and its close connection
with EU legislative activity. Advocate General Sharpston
stressed that whether an institution acts in a legislative,
executive or administrative capacity should not be de-
terminative. What should be decisive is the need to con-
duct a careful and objective assessment and provide de-
tailed and specific reasoning (Council v. Sophie in ‘t Veld,
2014, para. 98). The CJEU did not adopt this reasoning,
but still stressed that the principle of transparency ap-
plies to decision-making in the field of EU international
activity (Council v. Sophie in ‘t Veld, 2014, para. 76). It
acknowledged that the considerations relating to citizen
participation and the legitimacy of administration are
of a particular relevance where the Council is acting in
its legislative capacity. However, the General Court also
pointed out that the matter concerned an international
agreement with potential implications for EU legislative
activity and the protection of personal data, which is
a fundamental right (Sophie in ‘t Veld v. Council, 2012,
paras. 89, 92). The General Court also considered the ef-
fect of the on-going procedure for concluding the inter-
national agreement and established that
Indeed, the public interest in the transparency of the
decision-making process would become meaningless
if, as the Commission proposes, it were to be taken
into account only in those cases where the decision-
making process has come to an end. (Sophie in ‘t Veld
v. Council, 2012, para. 101)
TheCourt accepted thenon-disclosure of those elements
in the document that could reveal the strategic objec-
tives pursued by the EU in the negotiations. Outside
of those parts, the Council had not demonstrated how,
“specifically and actually”, harm to the public interest in
the field of international relations existed (Council v. So-
phie in ’t Veld, 2014, para. 46). The ruling clearly evi-
dences a much less categorical approach to the excep-
tion than the one found in its previous jurisprudence (Si-
son v. Council, 2007).
The second case brought byMs in ‘t Veld concerned a
Commission decision to refuse access to a number of doc-
uments relating to the famous draft international Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) produced during
the negotiations between the parties (Sophie in ‘t Veld v.
Commission, 2013). TheGeneral Court here provedmore
responsive to the Commission concerns. It emphasised
the “particularly sensitive and essential nature of the in-
terests” relating to international relations, which gives
the decisions on access “a complex and delicate nature
which calls for the exercise of particular care” and pre-
sumes “some discretion” (Sophie in ‘t Veld v. Commis-
sion, 2013, para. 108). It noted that EU positions natu-
rally change during negotiations, depending on conces-
sions and compromises made by others, and accepted
that “the formulation of negotiating positions may in-
volve a number of tactical considerations of the nego-
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tiators, including the European Union itself” (Sophie in
‘t Veld v. Commission, 2013, para. 125). Unilateral disclo-
sure of EU negotiating positions might have negative ef-
fects and seriously undermine the maintenance of mu-
tual trust, which is essential to the effectiveness of nego-
tiations and a very delicate exercise (Sophie in ‘t Veld v.
Commission, 2013, paras. 125–126). Finally, since the in-
ternational relations exception was mandatory and thus
involved no public interest test, arguments based on an
overriding public interest were rejected as “ineffective”
(Sophie in ‘t Veld v. Commission, 2013, para. 131). Over-
all, the Court proved sensitive to considerations relating
to the need to protect EU strategic objectives and the cli-
mate of negotiations.
The ACTA story has been mostly discussed from the
point of view of the European Parliament (EP) defending
the right to know and hold the Commission and Coun-
cil accountable for their actions, reflected later in its re-
fusal to give its consent to the conclusion of the agree-
ment. But the EP’s own transparency policy in relation to
the negotiations has also been scrutinised by the Euro-
peanOmbudsman following complaints by 28 digital civil
rights associations (European Ombudsman, 2013). They
claimed that in refusing to grant full access to the negoti-
ation documents that the EP had in its possession, largely
received from the Commission based on the Framework
Agreement between the two institutions (European Par-
liament & European Commission, 2010), it failed to act
in line with the legitimate and reasonable expectation
that the EP would live up to its past declarations on
transparency in the ACTA process (European Parliament,
2010). In the context of the Ombudsman investigation,
the EP line of defence closely followed that taken by
the Council and Commission in other cases, which it had
strongly criticised. The Ombudsman found nomaladmin-
istration on the Parliament’s part. The Ombudsman ex-
pressed an understanding for the difficulties involved in
revealing negotiating positions of other parties:
releasing the documents in question,which reveal the
negotiating position of the US and Japan, would be
highly likely to be detrimental to the EU’s relations
with those countries….It is likely that such disclosure
would have a negative effect on the climate of confi-
dence in the on-going negotiations, and that it would
hamper open and constructive co-operation. (Euro-
pean Ombudsman, 2010, para. 33)
A particular characteristic of the ACTA case related to the
agreement among the various negotiating partners that
matterswould remain confidential, the question then be-
ing whether the Commission in fact had the right to con-
sent to such a solution, keeping in mind its transparency
obligations under the Treaties. This issue was raised both
before theGeneral Court and the EuropeanOmbudsman.
The Court did not address the appropriateness of con-
fidentiality agreements, but accepted that the Commis-
sion’s refusal had been correctly based on Article 4(1)(a).
The Ombudsman was more critical and found that “seri-
ous consideration should be given by any EU body that
makes such a commitment to ensure that it does not
undermine the principles essential to a democratic EU
that underpin the Turco case-law” (European Ombuds-
man, 2013, para. 62).
The third recent case was brought by Professor
Besselink and concerned the draft Council Decision on
a negotiating mandate authorising the Commission to
negotiate the EU Accession Agreement to the European
Convention of Human Rights (Leonard Besselink v. Coun-
cil, 2013). The Court found that the Council had inter-
preted the international relations exception too broadly,
and stressed that it could only be used to protect objec-
tives that were subject to concrete negotiations. The pre-
cise content of EU negotiating directives had not been
previously disclosed, and could have been exploited by
the EU’s negotiating partners, thus establishing a risk to
the EU’s international relations. The Court did not discuss
the fact that, unlike in the ACTA case described above,
the EU’s negotiating partner, the Council of Europe, had
in fact placed all its negotiating directives on the internet,
which should have had some effect on the need to main-
tain a climate of confidence. But the Court did establish
that those parts of the directives which merely referred
to the principles included in the EU Treaties that should
govern the relevant negotiations, or the list of questions
to be addressed in the negotiations, should have been
handed out. The Court left the identification of these
parts to the Council itself, and in January 2014 the Coun-
cil finally decided that “at the present point in time, the
applicant may have access to document 9689/10 in its
entirety” (Council, 2014, para. 5). Formally, this was jus-
tified with the passing of time and the conclusion of
a draft agreement at negotiators’ level (Council, 2014,
paras. 4–5). The mandate is now publicly available in the
Council register and it is up to anyone interested to try to
identify the parts which might have fulfilled the criteria
established by the Court.
3.2. Increased Transparency in Negotiations?
These cases have demonstrated that international rela-
tions are difficult to treat as a categorical exception. They
include matters where it should be possible to consider
the public interest relating to transparency, especially
if the possible harm of disclosure seems limited or hy-
pothetical. An important feature of this jurisprudence
concerns the substance of these agreements. They are
fundamentally important international agreements that
have implications for the life of individual citizens. These
concerns are also relevant when considering the Transat-
lantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), which
is the most important of the new type of preferential
trade agreements the EU has negotiated since 2006. Con-
sequently, the need to ensure transparency has figured
high on the agenda. Numerous NGOs have stressed how
transparency in the negotiations needs to be ensured,
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since the TTIP would impact domestic regulations, stan-
dards and safeguards both in the US and the EU, as well
as future choices in permanent regulatory cooperation
(Gheyle & De Ville, 2017). Ultimately, a failure to commit
to more openness in TTIP negotiations will not only re-
sult in growing public opposition to TTIP as a whole but
also create a real risk of a biased and flawed agreement
(see Corporate Europe Observatory, 2017). Another ex-
ample of the interest provoked by the agreement is how
the Commission on-line consultation regarding the in-
vestment protection aspects of the envisaged agreement
garnered approximately 150,000 replies (European Com-
mission, 2015a). Following strong public reactions, key
EU documents have been released, together with joint
EU–US reports on the stage of negotiations.4 AsCremona
notes, the release of information on the TTIP is remark-
able, and has signalled a new approach to transparency
in trade negotiations (Cremona, 2015, p. 361).
However, doubts persist. A European Citizens’ Initia-
tive (ECI) invites the European Commission to recom-
mend to the Council to repeal the negotiating mandate
for the TTIP and not to conclude the Comprehensive Eco-
nomic and Trade Agreement (CETA). One of the grounds
refers in particular to how key policies should not be
deregulated in non-transparent negotiations.5 The mat-
ter is now pending before the General Court (Efler and
others v. Commission, 2014). Following a number of com-
plaints about the TTIP, the European Ombudsman also
opened an own-initiative inquiry into the matter (see Eu-
ropean Ombudsman, 2014a, 2014b), and subsequently
set three criteria for evaluating harm in this context: dis-
closurewould not “damagemutual trust between the ne-
gotiators; inhibit the development of free and effective
discussions in the context of the negotiations and/or re-
veal strategic elements of the negotiations either to the
other negotiating party or to third parties”. These crite-
ria would seem to exclude questions that are entirely in-
ternal to EU decision-making. Following the TTIP experi-
ence, it is likely to be difficult to roll back on transparency
in other negotiations. After all:
The publication of the EU’s positions at different
stages of elaboration and thinking, together with
openness to consultation and debate, helps to fill
a gap which is becoming evident as international
agreements are increasingly quasi-legislative in na-
ture. (Cremona, 2015, p. 362)
External and internal pressure to hand out Council
mandates has increased (Abazi & Adriaensen, 2017).
In March 2015, the Council decided to declassify the
mandate given to the Commission two years earlier to
negotiate an international agreement on trade in ser-
vices (TiSA), as a response to “a growing public interest
for this plurilateral agreement” (see Council, 2015; see
also Council, 2013). Corporate Europe’s Observatory’s re-
sponse to the Ombudsman’s TTIP consultation lists out a
serious number of international negotiating fora where
greater transparency is routinely exercised (Corporate
Europe Observatory, 2014).6 Many of the mandates that
have been subject to transparency appeals and then sub-
sequently disclosed—after a delay, during which negoti-
ations have certainly advanced considerably—highlight
the general nature of negotiating directives. This leaves
the Commission to make the substantive choices, and
should raise significant accountability issues in the con-
text of international negotiations—issues that require
democratic oversight at both EU and national levels. In
fact, transparency in external relations often appears just
as much as an exercise in ensuring accountability than
one relating to citizen participation as such.
4. External Logics in Internal Negotiations
The questions relating to openness, secrecy and the pos-
sible need to ensure a negotiating space for the institu-
tions can be mirrored against institutional practices in
the internal sphere, namely the EU law-making proce-
dures. The Court had an opportunity to interpret Arti-
cle 4(3) in the post-Lisbon legislative context when Ac-
cess Info Europe, an NGOpromoting freedomof informa-
tion in the EU, requested access to a legislative document
that included footnotes indicating the positions of indi-
vidualMember States. The central questionwaswhether
disclosure of such positions decreases the effectiveness
of decision-making and if yes, which one should take pri-
ority, effectiveness or openness. The Council lost in Gen-
eral Court and appealed to the Court of Justice, arguing
that undue and excessive weight had been attached to
transparency while ignoring considerations of effective-
ness (Council v. Access Info Europe, 2013). In the Coun-
cil’s view, identifying the delegations was not necessary
for ensuring a democratic debate. The CJEU rejected this
with reference to how full access can be limited only if
there is a genuine risk that the protected interests might
be undermined. The high standard of proof required to
establish that level of harmmakes it almost impossible to
rely on Article 4(3) in this context. In particular, accord-
ing to the Court, proposals for amendment or re-drafting
made by someMember States thatwere described in the
requested document are a part of the normal legislative
process, which “could not be regarded as sensitive…by
reference to any criterion whatsoever” (Council v. Access
Info Europe, 2013, para. 63).
This suggests that Member States’ positions in the
legislative context do not merit any particular protection
and are subject to full transparency, in contrast to posi-
tions in an international negotiating context that might
4 See the Commission TTIP website: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip
5 The Commission rejected the ECI with reference to how the ECI fell outside the framework of its powers to submit a proposal for an EU “legal act”. See
European Commission (2014).
6 These fora include the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the United Nations Framework for Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the World Intel-
lectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and the bodies under the Aarhus Convention.
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merit secrecy with reference to the need to achieve the
Union’s strategic objectives. The Court’s lack of under-
standing for the necessity of secrecy in the internal con-
text was something that the Council and certain Mem-
ber States fiercely objected to during the Access Info pro-
ceedings, stressing also how the internal “legislative pro-
cess is very fluid and requires a high level of flexibility” in
order for Member States to be free to modify their po-
sitions and maximise the chances of reaching an agree-
ment. In their view, maximum room for manœuvre for
the Member States is necessary in order to ensure a “ne-
gotiating space” and thereby preserve the effectiveness
of the legislative process. Identifying delegations would
reduce that room for manœuvre because this would
have the effect of triggering pressure from public opin-
ion, and thus hamper the Council’s decision-making pro-
cess (Council v. Access Info Europe, 2013, para. 24). The
Court rejected these arguments, but they illustrate how
theMember States’ viewof the EU legislative process has
not changed from the days when EU discussions were
considered international negotiations and as such sub-
ject to diplomatic secrecy.
Access to legislative documents, in particular those
relating to informal interinstitutional negotiations (tri-
logues), has become particularly topical. First, the new
Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Regulation ad-
dresses the organisation of the ordinary legislative proce-
dure in general, and the transparency of trilogies in par-
ticular (European Parliament, Council, & European Com-
mission, 2016, articles 32–40). Second, the European
Ombudsman has recently closed a strategic inquiry con-
cerning the proactive transparency of trilogues, stressing
their role as the forum where the deals are done and
the subsequent need to consider the proper trade-off
between Europeans’ right to open EU law-making pro-
cesses and the space to negotiate. The key considera-
tion in the inquirywaswhich information and documents
used in the trilogue context could be made proactively
available to the public, and at what point in time (Euro-
pean Ombudsman, 2015; Kingdom of Sweden andMaur-
izio Turco v. the Council, 2008, paras. 45–46). The submis-
sions received by the European Ombudsman in the con-
text of her inquiry from citizens, NGOs, academics and
national parliaments “overwhelmingly made the case
for enhanced Trilogue transparency” (EuropeanOmbuds-
man, 2015). Finally, there are a number of pending and
recently closed Court cases relating to legislative docu-
ments generally and documents relating to the trilogue
stage of negotiations more specifically.7 The pending
case brought by Emilio de Capitani against his former em-
ployer, the EP, concerns especially the four-column doc-
uments used as a basis for trilogues (De Capitani v. Eu-
ropean Parliament, 2015). In addition to the positions of
the three institutions involved in the negotiations, these
documents also include a fourth column indicating the
emerging compromise.
Efficient law-making is largely promoted through by-
passing the formal machinery of three readings and con-
ciliation (Bunyan, 2009). Efficiency is counted through
the number of closed legislative files for each Council
Presidency and EP Rapporteur (Leino, 2017). Trilogues
are the prime example of informal decision-making and
have taken over as the main forum for making legisla-
tive deals between the three institutions (Centre for Eu-
ropean Policy Studies High-Level Group, 2014, pp. 1–24;
see in greater detail Leino, 2017). They are an efficient
format for accommodating institutional positions, and
have led to a great majority of deals being closed early
in the legislative procedure. Their use is flexible: trilo-
gies “may be held at all stages of the procedure and at
different levels of representation, depending on the na-
ture of the expected discussion” (European Parliament,
Council, & European Commission, 2007). During the tri-
logue phase, the EU democratic process is in the hands
of very few: the EP rapporteur(s), the representatives
of the Council Presidency and Secretariat and a few
Commission officials. This phase largely escapes public
scrutiny. Civil society representatives have, for very good
reasons, pointed out how trilogues represent the victory
of efficient law-making over transparency (see e.g. Bun-
yan, 2009). National parliaments often experience dif-
ficulties following decision-making in trilogues. Amend-
ments aremade at great speed,which hinders their effec-
tive scrutiny at national level (House of Lords European
Union Committee, 2009, pp. 15–16).
Against this background, the recent recommenda-
tions by the European Ombudsman on enhancing tri-
logue transparency can be considered somewhat weak.
The Ombudsman recognises a general difficulty in trac-
ing and locating existing public information and recom-
mends the establishment of a joint database. She urges
the institutions to provide information on trilogue dates
and the institutions’ initial positions on the Commis-
sion proposal—something that will prove painful for
the Council, whose mandates often remain confiden-
tial when adopted at Coreper level. As far as the actual
trilogue negotiations are concerned, the Ombudsman
asks for general summary agendas before or shortly
after the trilogue meetings, but is satisfied with infor-
mation that does not reveal individual strategies or
compromise negotiations. She acknowledges that ac-
cess to the evolving versions of the four-column docu-
ment would allow the public to follow how a final text
has emerged from the institutions’ different starting
positions. However, the European Ombudsman proves
sensitive to institutional concerns relating to efficiency:
“It is arguable that the interest in well-functioning tri-
logue negotiations temporarily outweighs the interest
in transparency for as long as the trilogue negotia-
tions are ongoing” (European Ombudsman, 2016, para.
54). Four-column documents should however be made
proactively available as soon as possible after the nego-
7 For closed cases, see Herbert Smith Freehills LLP v. Commission (2016); Herbert Smith Freehills LLP v. Council (2016); Philip Morris Ltd v. Commission
(2016a, 2016b).
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tiations have been concluded (European Ombudsman,
2016, para. 56).
It is striking that these solutions are not familiar from
the legislative context but from the Court jurisprudence
and recent practices adopted in relation to international
regulatory agreements. In relation to both, sufficient
transparency is believed to be guaranteed through the
publication of initial positions. Transparency during ne-
gotiations is reduced to communication with reference
to considerations of efficiency. While in the broader con-
text of international affairs this sort of solutionmight pro-
voke celebration, in the legislative context, however, this
is hardly a satisfactory solution.
5. Conclusion
This paper showed that categorical solutions relating to
transparency or secrecy, or dichotomies based on a strict
division between “internal” and “external”, are funda-
mentally outdated. A more political debate is needed
on the way in which the exercise of democratic rights
can be effectively exhausted. In practice this often takes
place through the choices of technocrats in the EU insti-
tutions addressing requests by individual citizens. The ar-
guments used by the institutions to defend secrecy gives
reason for some concern, since it reflects an understand-
ing that is not responsive to openness and prioritises the
internal efficiency of the institution’s own work. A new
understanding of “harm” and the importance of open-
ness in legitimate governance would need to be intro-
duced into institutional thinking. It is exactly this angle
that has been repeatedly voiced by civil society organi-
sations in the context of both internal and external ne-
gotiations. The challenge relates to an overly broad use
of exception grounds, something that the Courts have
frequently pointed out. These cases represent only a mi-
nor part of the negative decisions adopted by the insti-
tutions, but the argumentation used in them provides in-
sights into how they reason. The rationale of openness
and transparency should not be too focused on account-
ability or deliberation when legislative acts are adopted,
but should speak to a corresponding need of public in-
volvement in international affairs. This would seem to be
exactly the point raised in the Laeken Declaration quoted
in the beginning of the paper: more efficient, but at the
same timemore open, andmore democratically account-
able.
Acknowledgments
I thank Emilia Korkea-aho, Liisa Leppävirta and Olli Mäen-
pää for useful discussions around the theme.
Conflict of Interests
The author declares no conflict of interests.
References
Abazi, V., & Adriaensen, J. (2017). Allies in transparency?
Parliamentary, judicial and administrative interplays
in the EU’s international negotiations. Politics & Gov-
ernance, 5(3), 75–86.
Abazi, V., & Hillebrandt, M. (2015). The legal limits
to confidential negotiations: Recent case law devel-
opments in Council transparency: Access Info Eu-
rope and In’t Veld. Common Market Law Review, 52,
825–846.
Bradford, A. (2012). The Brussels effect. Northwestern
University Law Review, 107(1), 1–67.
Bunyan, T. (2009). European Parliament: Abolish 1st
[and 2nd] reading secret deals—Bring back democ-
racy “warts and all”. Statewatch. Retrieved from
http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-84-ep-first-
reading-deals.pdf
Centre for European Policy Studies High-Level Group.
(2014). Shifting EU institutional reform into high
gear. Centre for European Policy Studies. Retrieved
from https://www.ceps.eu/publications/shifting-eu-
institutional-reform-high-gear-report-ceps-high-level
-group
ClientEarth v. Commission, Case T-424/14, EU:T:2015:
848 (2015).
Corporate Europe Observatory. (2014). TTIP talk: CEO’s
response to Ombudsman’s consultation on trans-
parency. Corporate Europe Observatory. Retrieved
from https://corporateeurope.org/international-tra
de/2014/10/ttip-talks-ceo-response-ombudsman-con
sultation-transparency
Corporate Europe Observatory. (2017). International
trade. Corporate EuropeObservatory. Retrieved from
https://corporateeurope.org/international-trade
Council. (2013). Draft directives for the negotiation of a
plurilateral agreement on trade in services (6891/13
ADD 1 DCL 1). Brussels: Council of the European
Union.
Council. (2014). Revised reply to confirmatory applica-
tion No 04/c/01/11 following the judgment of the
General Court in Case T-331/11. (5022/14). Brussels:
Council of the European Union.
Council. (2015). Press release: Trade in services agree-
ment: negotiating mandate made public. Council. Re-
trieved from http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/
press/press-releases/2015/03/150310-trade-services
-agreement-negotiating-mandate-made-public
Council v. Access Info Europe, Case C-280/11 P, EU:C:
2013:325 (2013).
Council v. Sophie in’t Veld, Case C-350/12 P, EU:C:2014:
2039 (2014).
Cremona, M. (2015). Guest editorial: Negotiating the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
(TTIP). Common Market Law Review, 52, 351–362.
Curtin, D. (2009). Executive power in the European Union.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 6–15 13
Curtin, D. (2012). Judging EU secrecy. Cahiers de Droit Eu-
ropéen, 2, 459–490.
Curtin, D., & Leino, P. (2016). Openness, transparency
and the right of access to documents in the EU.
In-depth analysis (Robert Schuman Centre for Ad-
vanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2016/63).
Retrieved fromhttps://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2879315##
De Capitani v. European Parliament, Case T-540/15
(2015).
Efler and others v. Commission, Case T-754/14 (2014).
European Commission. (2014). Commission decision of
10 September 2014 on the refusal to register the Eu-
ropean Citizens’ Initiative ‘Stop TTIP’ (C(2014) 6501
final). Brussels: European Commission.
European Commission. (2015a). Report presented today:
Consultation on investment protection in EU–US
trade talks. European Commission. Retrieved from
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?
id=1234
European Commission. (2015b). Management plan
2015 Directorate General internal market, in-
dustry, entrepreneurship and SMEs (DG growth)
(Ref. Ares(2015)3738909-10/09/2015). Brussels:
European Commission.
European Council. (2001). Presidency conclusions, Euro-
pean Council meeting in Laeken, 14 and 15 December
2001. Retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/background/docs/laeken_concl_
en.pdf
EuropeanOmbudsman. (2010).Decision of the European
Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complainant
90/2009/(JD)OV against the Council of the European
Union. Strasbourg: European Ombudsman.
European Ombudsman. (2013). Decision of the Euro-
pean Ombudsman in his inquiry into complaint
2393/2011/RA against the European Parliament.
Strasbourg: European Ombudsman.
European Ombudsman. (2014a). Letter to the Council of
the EU requesting an opinion in the European Om-
budsman’s own-initiative inquiry OI/10/2014/MMN
concerning transparency and public participation in
relation to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) negotiations. Strasbourg: Euro-
pean Ombudsman.
European Ombudsman. (2014b). Letter to the Euro-
pean Commission requesting an opinion in the
European Ombudsman’s own-initiative inquiry
OI/10/2014/MMN concerning transparency and
public participation in relation to the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotia-
tions. Strasbourg: European Ombudsman.
European Ombudsman. (2015). Decision in case
904/2014/OV on the European Commission’s public
consultation prior to its legislative proposal for a Reg-
ulation concerning the European single market for
electronic communications. Strasbourg: European
Ombudsman.
European Ombudsman. (2016). Decision of the European
Ombudsman setting out proposals following her strate-
gic inquiry OI/8/2015/JAS concerning the transparency
of dialogues. Strasbourg: European Ombudsman.
European Parliament. (2010). Written declaration pur-
suant to Rule 123 on the Rules of Procedure on the
lack of a transparent process for the Anti-Counter-
feiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and potentially ob-
jectionable content (0012/2010). Brussels: European
Parliament.
European Parliament, Council, & European Commission.
(2007). Joint declaration on practical arrangements
for the codecision procedure (article 251 of the EC
Treaty), OJ C145/5. Brussels: European Union.
European Parliament, Council, & European Commission.
(2016). Interinstitutional agreement of 13 April 2016
on better law-making, OJ L123/1. Brussels: European
Union.
European Parliament & European Commission. (2010).
Framework agreement on relations between the Eu-
ropean Parliament and the European Commission, OJ
L304/47. Brussels: European Union.
Gheyle, N., & De Ville, F. (2017). Howmuch is enough? Ex-
plaining the continuous transparency conflict in TTIP.
Politics & Governance, 5(3), 16–28.
Herbert Smith Freehills LLP v. Commission, Case T-
755/14, EU:T:2016:482 (2016).
Herbert Smith Freehills LLP v. Council, Case T-710/14,
EU:T:2016:494 (2016).
House of Lords European Union Committee. (2009).
Codecision and national parliamentary scrutiny
(17th Report of Session 2008–09). Retrieved from
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ld
select/ldeucom/125/125.pdf
Kingdom of Sweden and Maurizio Turco v. Council,
Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, EU:C:2008:
374 (2008).
Leino, P. (2011). Just a little sunshine in the rain: The
2010 case law of the European Court of Justice on
access to documents. Common Market Law Review,
48(4), 1215–1252.
Leino, P. (2014). Transparency, participation and EU in-
stitutional practice: An inquiry into the limits of the
‘widest possible’ (EUI Working Papers LAW 2014/3).
Retrieved from http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/
30580
Leino, P. (2017). The politics of efficient compromise in
the adoption of EU legal acts. InM. Cremona (Ed.), EU
legal acts: Challenges and transformations, collected
courses of the academy of European law. Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press.
Leino, P. (in press). The principle of transparency in EU ex-
ternal relations law—Does diplomatic secrecy stand
a chance of surviving the age of twitter? In M. Cre-
mona (Ed.), Structural Principles in EU external rela-
tions law. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Leonard Besselink v. Council, Case T-331/11, EU:T:2013:
419 (2013).
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 6–15 14
Macmillan, M. (2011). A short history of secrecy. For-
eign Policy. Retrieved from http://foreignpolicy.com/
2011/02/21/a-short-history-of-secrecy
Mendes, J. (2015). The EU and the international legal
order: The impact of international rules on EU admin-
istrative procedures. Notes for the JURI Committee
in the European Parliament. Retrieved from http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/72869/Mendes.
pdf
Novak, S. (2011). Is there a tension between transparency
and efficiency in decisions? The case of the Council of
the European Union. Florence: European University
Institute.
Philip Morris Ltd v. Commission, Case T-796/14, EU:T:
2016:483 (2016a).
Philip Morris Ltd v. Commission, Case T-18/15, EU:T:
2016:487 (2016b).
Schlyter v. Commission, Case T-402/12, EU:T:2015:209
(2015).
Scott, J. (2014). Extraterritoriality and territorial exten-
sion in EU law. American Journal of Comparative Law,
62, 87–125.
Sison v. Council, Case C-266/05 P, EU:C:2007:75 (2007).
Sophie in ‘t Veld v. Commission, Case T-301/19, EU:T:
2013:135 (2013).
Sophie in ’t Veld v. Council, Case T-529/09, EU:T:2012:
215 (2012).
Verein für Konsumenteninformation v. Commission,
Case T-2/03, EU:T:2005:125 (2005).
Waxman, H. (2004). The chemical industry, the Bush Ad-
ministration, and European efforts to regulate chem-
icals. Washington, DC: US House of Representatives
Committee on Government Reform.
Westlake, M., & Galloway, D. (2004). The Council of The
European Union. London: John Harper Publishing.
About the Author
Päivi Leino is Professor of International and European Law at UEF Law School, Adjunct Professor of EU
Law at the University of Helsinki, Academy of Finland Research Fellow and Visiting Fellow at the EUI
Law Department. She currently leads two research projects on transparency and participation in EU
decision-making funded by the Academy of Finland. She has previously worked as legal counsellor for
the Finnish government (2005–2015) participating in various international and EU negotiations.
Politics and Governance, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 3, Pages 6–15 15
